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TELEPHONE RATE REGULATION IN NEW BRUNSWICK 
AND THE RATE REGULATION PROCESS
Robert W. Kerr*
In an article in last year’s issue of this Journal,1 the author 
raised the question of whether the New Brunswick Board of Com­
missioners of Public Utilities understood normal rate regulation 
procedure. At that time the decision of the Board in the 1976 rate 
application of the New Brunswick Telephone Company2 raised 
some doubt on this matter.
Since then the Board has considered and decided another rate 
application by the New Brunswick Telephone Company.1 As a 
result of the 1977 decision, the doubt raised by the 1976 decision has 
been removed. It is now clear that the Board does not understand 
normal rate regulation procedure.
The clarity of the 1977 decision relates primarily to the same 
question that was discussed a year ago, the Board’s treatment of the 
test year concept. That concept was fully explained in the previous 
article and that discussion will not be repeated here. In its 1977 
decision the Board has made clear what was doubtful a year ago by 
explicitly authorizing the Telephone Company to collect over a 
period of 9!/ j  months the amount of additional revenue which under 
the test year concept ought to be collected only over a period of 12 
months.
The extent of the Board’s failure to understand the rate regula­
tion process is indicated by another aspect of the 1977 decision — 
the calculation of the rate base. In the 1976 decision the Board 
adopted a future test year. It adopted the Company’s projected 
average rate base for that year for the purpose of caluclating the 
Company’s allowable additional revenue requirement. As it turned 
out, the Company cut back its projected construction programme 
during the year. As a result, its average rate base during 1976 was
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approximately $5 million less than what was projected when the 
1976 rate decision was made.
While the Board neither approved or disapproved of this action 
which it viewed as a decision left to management under the regula­
tory system, the Board apparently concluded that the effect was to 
render excessive the rates allowed in 1976. To compensate, the 
Board reduced the average rate base for 1977 as otherwise calculated 
by an amount equivalent to the $5 million excess of the 1976 pro­
jected average rate base over the 1976 actual average rate base.
Two factors relating to this rate base adjustment by the Board 
tend to further confirm that the Board does not understand the rate 
regulation process. First, there is no evidence that the Board made 
the sort of analysis which would be necessary to establish whether 
the 1976 rates were actually rendered excessive by the reduction in 
construction. Secondly, by the type of adjustment made to compen­
sate for the supposedly excessive 1976 rates, the Board introduced 
an element into the newly approved rate structure which tends to 
render the new rate structure inadequate.
Whether the 1976 rates were actually excessive requires a 
review, not merely of the 1976 rate base, but of the 1976 rate of 
return. The Board makes no reference to this in adopting the rate 
base adjustment. Unless this question is considered, it is just as 
possible that the Company’s cutback in construction was fully 
consistent with, and arguably compelled by, the Board’s 1976 
decision as it is that the cutback was inconsistent with the 1976 
decision. If the former is the case, any downward adjustment in the 
new rate structure on this basis seems unjustified and punitive.
The objective of the Company in cutting back construction was 
undoubtedly to decrease what it calls the cost of capital. Since new 
construction is, for the most part, financed by new capital, any 
decrease in construction reduces the amount the company has to 
pay, by way of interest or dividends, for such new capital.
Since the Company normally has a fair amount of unused capa­
city in its system, such cutbacks can, moreover, be accomplished 
without significant effect on revenue in the short run. Indeed, since 
the actual cutbacks in this case involved rural improvements which 
appear not to be a profitable investment anyway, even in the long 
run the effect of reducing such construction tends to reduce expendi­
tures more than it reduces revenues.
In its 1976 decision the Board authorized the Company to 
increase rates so as to realize a rate of return of 13% on common 
equity. It also approved a rate of return on common equity fluctuat­
ing to as high as 15% “ if the Company can achieve a return higher 
than 13% because of favourable cost developments” .
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Taking all factors into account, there are two likely possibilities 
as to what the Company was attempting to achieve by the constuc- 
tion cutback and reduction in capital costs. It may be that develop­
ments, whether in terms of income or cost, were less favourable than 
the Company’s 1976 projections and that the Company was not even 
achieving the minimum 13% return on common equity. Alterna­
tively, it may be that the Company was achieving this 13% rate of 
return, but was seeking to increase the rate of return on common 
equity to 15%.
If the Company was achieving a rate of return on common 
equity of at least 13%, it may have thought it was entitled to seek an 
increase to 15% by cutting capital costs on the basis that these were 
favourable cost developments within the 1976 decision of the Board. 
If this was the Company’s objective, however, it is submitted that it 
was inconsistent with the Board’s 1976 decision as properly inter­
preted and the Board had cause to regard the 1976 rates as exces­
sive. Capital costs, including interest on borrowed capital, are 
treated as part of the rate of return in rate regulation, and the 
Board’s decisions to this extent have followed normal rate regulation 
practice. The Board’s reference to favourable cost developments in 
its 1976 decision seems clearly to involve something outside of and in 
contrast to the rate of return which is separately referred to in the 
same sentence. It seems obvious that the Board was referring to costs 
reflected in the Company’s income statement, and not to the cost of 
capital. Therefore, by cutting construction and capital costs to 
achieve a 15% return on common equity, the Company would not be 
acting as contemplated by the 1976 decision. The Board allowed for 
a 15% return on common equity, but by reducing current costs, not 
capital costs.
On the other hand, if the Company was not achieving the mini­
mum 13% return on equity, it was faced with an entirely different 
situation. No provision for such a situation was made by the Board. 
In such circumstances, the Company would surely be entitled to use 
its best judgment in undertaking whatever measures were necessary 
to restore its financial position to that level which the Board 
approved as a minimum. Indeed, since in these circumstances the 
rates approved by the Board would be clearly inadequate, as seen 
with the benefit of aftersight, one could even say that the Company 
was compelled by the Board decision to achieve economies wherever 
possible.
At the very least, a reduction in unprofitable capital expendi­
tures would be reasonable measure in these circumstances, and it 
would take clear language to say that such action was contrary to the 
Board’s intendment. In any event, as long as the rate of return on 
common equity following such measures remained at or below 13%,
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there could be no basis for the Board to say that the rates were exces­
sive. Unless the rates in 1976 were excessive, there is no justification 
for any consequential adjustment in the 1977 rates, but such an 
adjustment is precisely the effect of the rate base adjustment made 
by the Board.
If it is assumed that the rates for 1976 were excessive as a result 
of the Company’s construction cutback, the question arises as to 
what was an appropriate compensatory adjustment. Doubts may 
also be raised as to whether the Board has power to make such an 
adjustment, but, since that is a question of the jurisdiction of the 
Board which does not affect the question of its appreciation of the 
rate regulation process, it is not proposed to consider that question 
here.
The theory of rate regulation is that a set of rates are approved 
for the indefinite future as being reasonable on the basis that they 
yield a reasonable rate of return during a sample year of the Com­
pany’s operation. That is the test year concept. If the rates are set 
below the level which is indicated by the figures of the sample year, 
which is the effect of the rate base adjustment made by the Board, 
then the rates are purely and simply inadequate.
While such rates may be justified for a short term in compensa­
tion for excessive rates in a prior period, this overlooks the fact that 
the rates are fixed for the indefinite future. If rates are fixed at a 
level which is inadequate on the basis of present circumstances, the 
effect is to accelerate the date on which a new rate application will be 
necessary. While annual rate applications appear to be the current 
practice in New Brunswick anyway so that no real effect on the 
frequency of such application may result, the failure of the Board to 
even consider this question again suggests that they do not under­
stand the process of rate regulation.
Where a need for a rate increase is indicated, it would seem 
better to adjust for the prior excessive rates by postponing imple­
mentation of that increase entirely for whatever period is 
appropriate to offset the previous excess. In that way the new rates, 
when they do come into force, will be adequate rates and will stand a 
better chance of remaining so for some reasonable period of time.
Rough calculations indicate that the tendency to inadequacy of 
the approved rates resulting from the rate base adjustment was 
approximately balanced by the tendency to excessiveness of those 
same rates resulting from the Board’s lack of understanding of the 
test year concept. If the resulting rates are reasonable, however, it is 
a matter of coincidence, not of sound rate regulation. It seems 
appropriate to recall the old adage that two wrongs do not make a 
right.
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If the Board does not understand what it is doing, the question 
arises whether there is some process, other than the process of rate 
regulation, that the Board is following. The answer seems clear. The 
Board is acting as if it were assessing compensation or damages.
In its peculiar application of the test year concept, the Board 
determined that in the coming year the Company was entitled to a 
certain additional profit. It then awarded that profit to the Company 
by allowing it to set whatever rates are necessary to realize that 
profit, without regard to the rate of return that the Company 
actually earns while those rates are in force.
In its adjustment of the rate base, the Board determined that 
the award it had made the previous year was excessive in view of 
what actually occurred, and it reduced its award for the coming year 
by the same amount as a set-off. Again, the Board gave no consider­
ation to the actual rate of return that the rates produced, either with 
respect to the previous year for which it determined there to be an 
excess or with respect to the current year in which it imposed the set­
off.
The effect of this approach by the Board is that it has adopted, 
perhaps without realizing it, a philosophy of rate regulation that is 
quite controversial. This is the philosophy that the role of regulation 
is to fix profits, rather than rates. This philosophy is controversial, 
not because it involves an upper limit on profits which is the object 
of rate regulation, but because it leads rather easily to the attitude by 
the regualtor that part of its role is also to guarantee a certain profit 
to the regulated industry. This attitude can lead to overly ready 
acceptance of accounting figures submitted by the regulated 
industry and an automatic passing on of increased costs into the 
form of increased rates. This attitude tends to reduce the need for 
the regulated industry to exercise sound entrepreneurial judgment 
and seek internal efficiencies. Yet it is presumably the desire for the 
exercise of such judgment which is a major contributing factor to the 
decision that a public utility should be left in private hands under 
regulation, rather than taken over by public ownership.
